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I. INTRODUCTION
In early 1994, an American teenager was caned by Singapore
authorities after his conviction for various acts of vandalism. This
highly publicized punishment sparked sharp controversies in the
United States. Amnesty International, along with many columnists,
condemned Michael Fay's sentence as too harsh, given his youth and
the non-violent nature of the crime.' The American public, by con-
trast, strongly supported the punishment.2  Apparently, many
Americans felt that if tougher sanctions were imposed on youths who
committed criminal acts in this country, our delinquency levels would
more closely resemble Singapore's almost negligible offense rates.3
Given the widely held perception that America's juvenile crime
rates are increasing, the controversy over Singapore's punishment of
Michael Fay highlights a dilemma of growing importance in United
States society. What is the proper balance between rehabilitation and
punishment, the dual goals of the juvenile justice system? 4
1. See, for example, Condemn Singapore's Brutality, N.Y. Times 18 (April 10, 1994)
(arguing that Americans should not be supporting Singapore's attitude of enforcing order at the
price of imposing cruel and unusual punishment). Caning is, by all accounts, an extremely
painful puishment that can cause a person to "pass out, go into shock, or sustain permanent
scarring." Id.
2. John Leo, America's Retreat From Disorder, 116 U.S. News & World Rpt. 25 (April 25,
1994) (citing approval rates of up to to 75%).
3. See Michael DeCourcy-Hinds, Teen-Ager Caned in Singapore Returns Home, N.Y.
Times 12 (June 23, 1994) (noting that people in Dayton, Ohio, Fay's hometown,
"overwhelmingly" supported his punishment, and quoting one resident as saying. "A lot of
people related the lack of crime to the severe punishment in Singapore.... A lot of people here
are fed up with juvenile crime"). Notably, in the wake of the debate over Fay's caning, proposals
to institute paddling as punishment for delinquent juveniles have already been made in several
jurisdictions in this country. See, for example, California Assembly Bill 150(a), Spec. Sess. A., §
1 (1994); Louisiana House Bill 38(c), 3d Extraordinary Sess., § 1 (1994). See also, Canings for
Vandals Proposed in St. Louis, N.Y. Times 8 (May 20, 1994) (discussing a local alderman's
proposal for public caning of graffiti vandals); Bonna M. de la Cruz, Judge Watches as Teen
Whipped, Tennessean 1 (Sept. 10, 1994) (describing juvenile court judge's authorizing punish-
ment of delinquent 16-year-old girl with a court-supervised whipping, administered by the girl's
parents).
4. 'Punishment" is used here as a general term encompassing several related philoso-
phies: deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. See note 19 and accompanying text.
480
PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION
In recent years, many states have enacted laws specifically
addressing the problem of serious and habitual juvenile crime.5
Several prominent commentators have interpreted this trend as an
indication that society has rejected the juvenile court's traditional
philosophy of rehabilitation in favor of more punitive, offense-oriented
sanctions, and some have concluded that recent changes call into
question the very viability of the juvenile court system.6
This Note challenges such an interpretation. By focusing on
statutes which authorize and create integrated programs for serious
and habitual juvenile offenders (as opposed to the "get tough" statutes
that have so intrigued most researchers), this Note demonstrates that
current scholarship has been premature in pronouncing the demise of
rehabilitation as a goal and method of the juvenile justice system.
Part II will briefly outline the philosophies of rehabilitation and pun-
ishment and discuss their importance in the current juvenile justice
system. Parts III.A and III.B will discuss two different types of
serious and habitual juvenile offender statutes-the punitive, "get
tough" approach and the integrated, intensive supervision program.
Part III.C will compare the two approaches in order to show that, far
from signaling a wholesale rejection of the rehabilitative philosophy,
recent legislative reforms evince a continued commitment to both
punishment and rehabilitation. Finally, by examining the goals and
effectiveness of such statutes, Part IV of this Note will demonstrate
that punishment and rehabilitation are compatible goals, both in
theory and in practice. Each deserves its place in the juvenile justice
system, and integrated serious and habitual juvenile offender statutes
are one means of achieving an appropriate balance.
II. THE DUAL GOALS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Most states' juvenile justice systems are designed to achieve
several goals: rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, and retribu-
tion. These goals may be classified broadly into two primary catego-
ries: rehabilitation, which focuses on the offender, and punishment,
which centers attention on the offense. 7
5. See note 49. Most of these statutes can be grouped into one of two major types: "get
tough" reforms, and integrated serious and habitual offender programs.
6. See Part IIIA of this Note for a discussion of the theory that recent reforms have
made the juvenile court more punitive and have eliminated its commitment to rehabilitation
and for an outline of arguments for and against eliminating the juvenile court.
7. Professor Barry Feld originally classified juvenile sentencing practices as offender-




Rehabilitation, in the context of the juvenile justice system, is
premised on the philosophy that a child who commits a delinquent act
can be turned from his or her deviant ways, not through threats of
punishment, but by changing the youth's thinking, goals, and values.8
It generally rests on the belief that children lack the moral maturity
of adults, and, as such, are not fully culpable for their actions.9
Rehabilitation theory views juvenile delinquency as caused by
influences external to the child, such as poverty, abuse, and neglect.
Thus the "pure" rehabilitation theorist holds that the proper response
to juvenile crime is not punishment, but rather treatment services
designed to help the child learn to cope with negative external
influences in non-delinquent ways.10
Rehabilitation has been a stated goal of juvenile justice sys-
tems from their inception. Illinois, for example, the first state to
develop a court system exclusively for juveniles, based it expressly on
the philosophy of rehabilitation., To this day, rehabilitation remains
a primary goal of most states' juvenile codes. 2 In addition, the
prevailing United States Supreme Court decision on this issue,
Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 821,
821-22 (1988). See also note 56. For purposes of clarity, and because this Note is designed to
critique Professor Feld's theory, it will utilize his system of classifying the goals and methods of
juvenile sentencing statutes.
8. Anne R. Mahoney, "Man, I'm Already Dead" Serious Juvenile Offenders in Context, 5
Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 443, 454 (1991).
9. Martin L. Forst and Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The
Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 323, 324
(1991). See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion) (noting
that the Court has "endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime
committed by a juvenile" because juveniles are inexperienced, have less education and intelli-
gence, and are more likely to act based on "emotion" or "peer pressure" than are adults).
10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 325-26 (1967) (noting that the "underlying philosophy" of the
rehabilitative model is "that delinquency [is] an illness the state could cure by providing indi-
vidual and expert attention to ... each delinquent youth's situation").
11. See Illinois Juvenile Court Act §21, 1899 IMI. Laws 137 (stating that the purpose of the
juvenile court law was to ensure that "the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approxi-
mate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents"). The Illinois law was a
product of the Progressive Era, and more specifically the efforts of reformers such as Jane
Addams, Julia Lathrop, and Lucy Flower, whose Chicago Women's Club, along with other
public-spirited organizations, began a movement which culminated in the drafting of the Illinois
law. Barry Krisberg and James F. Austin, Reinventing Juvenile Justice 29 (Sage, 1993). By
1925, all states except two had established separate courts for juveniles. Id. at 30.
12. See, for example, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 9-27-302(1) (1987) (stating that the purposes of the
Arkansas Juvenile Code include assuring "that all juveniles brought to the attention of the
courts receive the guidance, care, and control... which will best serve the emotional, mental,
and physical welfare of the juvenile").
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McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,1 holds that the juvenile court is funda-
mentally a rehabilitative system and is not sufficiently punitive to
require that juveniles coming before it receive the full panoply of legal
rights guaranteed adult criminal defendants. 14 While McKeiver's
reasoning has been criticized on this point,15 and while the Court itself
acknowledged that the rehabilitative "ideal" is rarely achieved in
practice, 16 the Court has yet to overturn its affirmation of the rehabili-
tative model for juveniles.
Indeed, despite a great deal of commentary emphasizing the
increasingly punitive nature of the juvenile justice system,1 the reha-
bilitative philosophy remains embedded in the law. State statutes
overwhelmingly continue -to express a commitment to rehabilitative
goals, and current case law abounds with discussions of the juvenile
court's rehabilitative purpose.' s Thus, even while there is evidence
13. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
14. McKeiver held that juveniles do not have a constitutional right to trial by jury in the
adjudicative stage of a delinquency proceeding. Id. at 545. Earlier decisions had established
that juveniles have certain other constitutional rights in a delinquency hearing. See note 22.
15. See Barry Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 691, 696
(1991) (arguing that the Court "did not analyze the differences between treatment and punish-
ment').
16. The Court stated, "We must recognize ... that the fond and idealistic hopes of the
juvenile court proponents and early reformers ... have not been realized.... The community's
unwillingness to provide people and facilities and to be concerned, the insufficiency of time de-
voted, the scarcity of professional help, the inadequacy of dispositional alternatives, and our
general lack of knowledge all contribute to dissatisfaction with the experiment." McKeiver, 403
U.S. at 543-44. In more recent cases, the Court has continued to hold that the juvenile system
is primarily a rehabilitative, rather than punitive, institution. See, for example, Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (stating that "the Constitution does not mandate the elimina-
tion of all differences in the treatment of juveniles.... The State has a parens patriae interest
in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child'). See also U.S. v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329,
1343 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that one justification for the procedural
informality of juvenile proceedings is "that the focus of sentencing is on treatment, not punish-
ment").
17. See Feld, 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 691, 716 (cited in note 15) (noting that "rehabilitative
euphemisms... cannot disguise the punitive reality of juvenile confinement'; Feld, 68 B.U. L.
Rev. at 821 (cited in note 7) (recognizing the gap between rehabilitative rhetoric and the puni-
tive aspects of the system); Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 323
(cited in note 9) (noting that the sanctions imposed by the juvenile system have become more
punitive); Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 443 (cited in note 8) (arguing
that the juvenile system must do more than just "get tough" with offenders, but also address the
underlying social causes of the problems).
18. See, for example, State ex rel Juvenile Dep't of Kiamath County v. Reynolds, 317 Or.
560, 857 P.2d 842, 845-46 (1993) (stating "[wjithout exception, this court's cases support the
conclusion that the Oregon juvenilejustice system always has been focused on the rehabilitation
of delinquent youth'; In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 527 A.2d 35, 38 (1987) (stating "the overriding
goal of Maryland's juvenile statutory scheme is to rehabilitate and treat delinquent juveniles so
that they become useful and productive members of society"); In re P.M., 156 Vt. 303, 592 A.2d
862, 865 (1991) (stating "the purpose of Vermont's juvenile provisions is not to punish juvenile
offenders, but to... provide treatment consistent with the public interest for children who have
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that the juvenile court is becoming more punitive, neither legislatures
nor courts are yet willing to abandon the goal of rehabilitation.
B. Punishment
Punishment is the second major goal of the juvenile justice
system. The term "punishment" generally encompasses one or more
of the following related goals: deterrence, incapacitation, and retribu-
tion.19
Once exclusively devoted to rehabilitation, juvenile justice
systems have, in recent years, increasingly emphasized punitive
goals.20 There are two reasons for this changing emphasis. First, in
the 1960s, commentators and courts began to acknowledge that much
of the juvenile court's "treatment" was, in fact, punitive. Based on
this recognition, Supreme Court decisions such as In re Gault2l
ushered in a variety of procedural protections-notice, counsel, cross-
examination, and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of
proof-normally associated with criminal trials.22  While McKeiver
committed delinquent acts"). See also note 12 (regarding state statutes and rehabilitative
goals).
19. Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 333-37 (cited in note
9).
20. See notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing punitive reforms of juvenile justice
statutes).
21. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22 Id. at 33, 41, 57. In Gault, a 15-year-old boy, Gerald Gault, was taken into custody by
the sheriff of Gila County, Arizona based on the complaint of a neighbor, who claimed that
Gerald had made a "lewd" and "indecent" call to her. Id. at 4-5. No notice of arrest was given to
Gerald's parents, nor did the authorities give them written notice of the charges against Gerald
or notice of his hearing. Id. at 5-6. At Gerald's hearing, the complainant was not present, no
witnesses were sworn in, no transcript was made, and no record of the proceeding was produced,
except for a "referral card" which listed the charge against Gerald as "Lewd Phone Calls." Id. at
7. At the close of the hearing, the judge declared Gerald a delinquent child and committed him
to the State Industrial School until the age of majority (age 21). Id. at 7-8. On habeas corpus,
Gerald's parents claimed that the Arizona Juvenile Code, which permitted such a committment
upon a finding that a child is "delinquent," was unconstitutional because it allowed the delin-
quency determination to be made at a hearing which lacked the basic procedural protections
available in adult criminal trials. Id. at 9-10. The Court agreed, holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles a juvenile delinquent to: adequate written notice
of charges; the right to counsel, retained or appointed; and confrontation and cross-examination
of witnesses. Id.
In a later case, the Court held that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof also
applied during delinquency proceedings. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). In McKeiver,
however, the Court refused to extend the constitutional protections available to delinquents any
further, and held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a
trial by jury at the adjudicative stage of a delinquency proceeding. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545.
A principal rationale for this refusal was the Court's belief in the rehabilitative goals of the
juvenile system: "The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to say that, despite
disappointments of grave dimensions, it still does not hold promise, and we are reluctant to say
. . . that the system cannot achieve its rehabilitative goals." Id. at 547.
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ended this expansion by refusing to extend to juveniles the right to
trial by jury in delinquency proceedings, the rights granted during the
Gault era helped transform juvenile courts into institutions that more
closely resembled the punitive adult criminal court.23
Second, the juvenile court has become more punitive as state
legislatures have responded to the public's demand for tougher
policies toward juvenile crime. The past two decades have been
marked by a perception that the rate of juvenile crime-especially
violent juvenile crime--is increasing,24 and some statistical evidence
supports this perception.5 This phenomenon, coupled with the belief
that juvenile courts were too lenient on young offenders, helped bring
about official changes in the philosophy of the juvenile justice
system-changes that rejected the exclusively rehabilitative model
and substituted in its place the combined goals of rehabilitation and
23. See Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 328-29, 331
(cited in note 9) (discussing how demand for greater procedural protections helped change the
focus of juvenile courts away from the individual characteristics of the offender and more
toward elements of the offense, such as proving the "crime"). The McKeiver decision, in refusing
to extend the right to trial by jury to delinquency proceedings, halted the convergence of the
juvenile and criminal systems. Indeed, the desire to maintain a separate juvenile system was
one of the Court's justifications for refusing to extend all the procedural rights of criminal
defendants to juveniles in delinquency hearings. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545-46. The Court
wrote: "If the formalities of the criminal ... process are to be superimposed on the juvenile
court system, there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusion-
ment will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it." Id. at 550-
51.
24. See Debate Rages on Treatment of Violent Juvenile Offenders (CNN television broad-
cast, Sept. 14, 1994) (transcript available on Lexis, NEWS library, CNN file) (citing results of
CNN-USA Today poll, which showed 52 percent of those surveyed thought juveniles should
receive the same punishment as adults, and stating that more and more Americans feel it is
time to "get tough on the nation's youngest criminals," given statistics showing rising juvenile
crime rates). See also Charles Krauthammer, People Are Sick of Extreme Libertarianism, Wash.
Post 17 (April 11, 1994) (stating that "the laissez-faire, everything-goes regime of the past 30
years ... has given our cities a palpable sense of danger). However, despite the popular view
that the public overwhelmingly supports "get tough" legislation, a recent comprehensive na-
tional study found that the public is not exclusively set on punitive reforms. The survey found
that 73% of respondents believed rehabilitation should be the primary goal of the juvenile
justice system, while only 12% felt its main objective should be punishment. Moreover, while
50% wanted juveniles accused of "serious property crimes" tried in adult courts, and 68%
wanted youths who committed "serious violent crimes" tried as adults, well over half the re-
spondents did not want juveniles even with these serious offenses to be sentenced as adults or to
serve time in adult prisons. Support of funding alternative dispositions--community-based
counseling and education programs, job training, and restitution programs-ranged from 57% to
81%. Ira M. Schwartz, Shenyang Guo, and John J. Kerbs, Public Attitudes Toward Juvenile
Crime and Juvenile Justice: Implications for Public Policy, 13 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Policy 241,
249-50, 251 (1992).
25. See Jeffrey Butts and Eileen Poe, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Juvenile Justice Bulletin,
Offenders in Juvenile Court, 1990 (Dec. 1993) (stating that juvenile courts in the U.S. handled
10% more cases in 1990 than in 1986). But see Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics
& Pub. Policy at 332 n.24 (cited in note 9) (noting that while juvenile crime did increase signifi-
cantly between 1960 and 1975, the rate has "leveled off or decreased" since 1975).
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punishment.26  This more punitive approach toward juvenile
delinquency is evidenced by the fact that serious offenders are now
more frequently waived to the adult courts, that mandatory minimum
sentences are imposed more regularly on juveniles, and that juvenile
court procedures have become more formal.27 The enactment of
serious and habitual juvenile offender statutes, discussed in detail in
this Note, is one example of this more punitive philosophy.
1. Social Protection: Deterrence and Incapacitation
Punishment, to the extent it is designed to protect society,
encompasses the goals of deterrence28  and incapacitation.2 9
Deterrence and incapacitation have not always been stated purposes
of the juvenile court.30 Nonetheless, an increasing number of states
have included social protection among the official goals of their
juvenile justice systems.3' The changes in California's Juvenile Code
illustrate the point. As of 1983, the code's purpose clause included
protection of the public, but this goal was plainly secondary, as it was
listed after the goal of securing the "welfare of the minor. '32 In 1984,
however, the old purpose clause was repealed and under the new
provision "the protection and safety of the public" became the first
listed goal of the juvenile justice system.33  In sum, social
protection-and thus the philosophies of deterrence and
26. Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 332-33. See notes
57-63 and notes 86-98 (providing examples of statutory reforms).
27. Feld, 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 696 (cited in note 15).
28. As used here, the term "deterrence" includes both specific deterrence, which justifies
punishment in order to reduce future crimes by the same offender, and general deterrence,
which refers to using the example of the offender's punishment to discourage others from
committing crimes.
29. Incapacitation involves incarcerating or otherwise physically preventing the offender
from accomplishing further criminal acts. Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at
455 (cited in note 8).
30. See Illinois Juvenile Court Act § 21, 1899 Ill. Laws 137 (mentioning only the care of
the child as its goal). See also Feld, 68 B.U. L. Rev. at 825 (cited in note 7) (stating that early
juvenile courts emphasized treatment and rejected the jurisprudence of adult criminal proceed-
ings).
31. See, for example, Ala. Code § 12-15-1.1 (1994) (stating that "[tlhe purpose of this
chapter is to... preserve the public peace and security'; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 202(a) (West
1984) (stating that "[tihe purpose of this chapter is to provide for the protection and safety of the
public"); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 9-27-302(1) (1987) (stating that a purpose of juvenile code is the "best
interests of the state" and "protection of the public"). See also Feld, 68 B.U. L. Rev. at 842-45
(explaining that at least 10 of 42 states with purpose clauses in their juvenile codes have
amended such clauses in recent years to include "public safety" as a goal).
32. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 202(a).
33. Id., as amended by 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 756 §§ 1, 2. For a discussion of California's




incapacitation-has taken its place beside rehabilitation as a major
goal of many juvenile justice systems.
2. Retribution: Just Deserts
The goal of punishment also includes retribution. Retribution,
or 'just deserts," is the theory that punishment should be carried out
in proportion to a criminal's moral culpability.34 The "pure" retribu-
tivist justifies punishment not on the ground that it will reduce fiture
crimes, or rehabilitate an offender, but rather solely on the ground
that an offender deserves it. For the retributivist, moral culpability
alone is a necessary and sufficient prerequisite for imposing punish-
ment.3 5
Early juvenile systems affirmatively rejected any reliance on
retributive goals. The Progressive reformers who founded the juve-
nile court at the beginning of this century avoided retribution because
it conflicted with their exclusive emphasis on rehabilitation and with
their belief that children were not fully culpable for their delinquent
acts.36
Both judicial decisions and juvenile codes officially continue to
reject retribution as a goal of the juvenile justice system.3 7 Few court
opinions acknowledge retribution as an aim of the juvenile system,38
and some statutes specifically express a preference for rehabilitative
over retributive goals. Arkansas's juvenile code is typical. It states
that its purposes are to be achieved by "substituting for retributive
punishment, whenever possible, methods of . . . rehabilitation."39
Even certain states that have amended their juvenile codes to reject
an exclusive emphasis on rehabilitation have sometimes taken pains
to point out that the move toward a philosophy of social protection
34. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in Joel Feinberg and Hyman
Gross, eds., Philosophy of Law 685 (Wadsworth, 4th ed. 1991).
35. Id. at 686.
36. Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 324 (cited in note 9).
The authors write that the Progressives "envisioned a separate system of justice which took
cognizance of the belief that juveniles were different from adults and needed to be protected,
nurtured, and treated, rather than held completely responsible and punished for their wrongdo-
ing." Id.
37. See, for example, Reynolds, 857 P.2d at 846 (citing Hills v. Pierce, 113 Or. 386, 231 P.
652 (1925)) (stating that the purpose of Oregon's juvenile justice system is "not to convict or
punish but to protect").
38. But see In re Javier A, 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 421 (1984) (stating
that "the purposes of the juvenile process have become more punitive). See also note 45 for
other cases discussing retribution in the juvenile system.
39. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 9-27-302(3) (1987). See also Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-
802(a) (1989) (stating purpose ofjuvenile delinquency proceeding is rehabilitation).
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does not mean that the system should also become retributive.
California's amendment of its juvenile code, for instance, included a
special clause stating that "[p]unishment, for the purposes of this
chapter, does not include retribution."40
Nonetheless, as discussed above, there is a great deal of evi-
dence that retribution has become a goal for more than a few juvenile
justice systems.41 One of the most commonly cited examples of this
development is that of Washington state, which, in 1977, adopted a
new Juvenile Justice Act, the stated purpose of which was to establish
a system which would ensure "that youth.., be held accountable for
their offenses" and to "[p]rovide for punishment commensurate with
the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender."42
Washington's Juvenile Code thus clearly includes a retributive
element: the notion that punishment should be in proportion to the
crime is the essence of retribution.43 Like Washington, other states
have revised the purpose clauses of their juvenile codes in ways that
reflect a more retributive philosophy.44 As a result of these statutory
changes, some courts have acknowledged that the juvenile justice
system is partly based on retribution.45
Finally, as many commentators have pointed out, despite the
rhetoric of rehabilitation, the reality is that many juveniles are pun-
ished by the juvenile system under the guise of being "treated.''46
40. Cal. Weif. & Inst. Code § 202(e) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
41. See Feld, 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 692 (cited in note 15); Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre
Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 336 (cited in note 9) (recognizing the support that punish-
ment based systems have received from lawmakers and lobbyists across the political spectrum).
42. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.010(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1988).
43. See Moore, Moral Worth of Retribution at 685 (cited in note 34).
44. See, for example, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 9-27-302 (stating that "the application of sanctions
which are consistent with the seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all cases"); Cal. Weif.
& Inst. Code § 202 (noting that minors should "receive care, treatment, and guidance... which
holds them accountable for their behavior"); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.001(2) (West 1990) (recognizing
that "application of sanctions which are consistent with the seriousness of the offense is appro-
priate in all cases").
45. See, for example, In re P.M., 592 A.2d at 865 (recognizing that the purpose of
Vermont's juvenile code was to treat, rather than punish, but concluding that such goals "can
only be accomplished when children who have committed acts.., proscribed by our laws are
held accountable for their actions so that they can be required to participate in appropriate
treatment programs" (emphasis added); In re D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d 772, 780 (Minn. App. 1987)
(Crippen, J., dissenting) (asserting that the commitment of a juvenile offender to a secure
facility for a determinate sentence was "[ilnescapably ... a criminal justice sentence, not a
juvenile court disposition aimed at doing what is best for the individual"); In re Seven Minors, 99
Nev. 427, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (1983) (discussing the advantages of the juvenile court "formally
recognizing the legitimacy of punitive and deterrent sanctions for criminal offenses).
46. Barry Feld, for example, has criticized the traditional juvenile court for punishing "in
the name of treatment." 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 723 (cited in note 15). Similarly, Forst and
Blomquist refer to the "de facto punitive characteristics of the juvenile court's sanctions," 5
Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 328 (cited in note 9), and even Irene Rosenberg, a
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Indeed, the primary motivation for the Supreme Court's extension of
basic procedural safeguards to juvenile delinquents in In re Gault was
the realization that what officially passed for "rehabilitation" was
really quite similar to punitive incarceration.47 Some courts, such as
the Supreme Court of West Virginia, have been even more direct in
acknowledging the retributive realities of the purportedly rehabilita-
tive juvenile court.48
In sum, retribution, which was a philosophy plainly foreign to
the creators of the original juvenile court, has become both a con-
scious goal (in a few states) and a practical reality (in many others) of
the current juvenile system. Serious and habitual juvenile offender
statutes, the purposes of which are sometimes expressly retributive,
are examples of the juvenile justice system's growing emphasis on
punitive goals.
III. SERIOUS AND HABITUAL JUVENILE OFFENDER STATUTES
At least sixteen states have enacted statutes specifically ad-
dressing the problem of sentencing serious and habitual juvenile
offenders. 49 Some of these statutes set forth special sentencing crite-
ria for a specific list of particularly severe or violent crimes.50 Other
statutes set forth a definition of a "serious or habitual juvenile of-
fender" and combine this with a section or provision for the
vigorous defender of the juvenile court, admits "the juvenile courts impose punishment in the
name of treatment." Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the
Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 163, 165.
47. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 27 (stating that "[h]owever euphemistic the title, a
'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which
the child is incarcerated'.
48. We acknowledge what has been an unspoken conclusion: our treatment looks a lot
like punishment ... [and] treatment is often disguised punishment." State ex rel D.D.H. v.
Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401, 415-16 (W.Va. 1980). See also In re D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d at 780
(Crippen, J., dissenting) (stating that juvenile court's disposition of youth to a term of 180 days
in a county facility, pursuant to sentencing guidelines, was "inescapably" a "criminal justice
sentence" which deprived the youth of the same liberty as a sentence in an adult prison would).
49. See Ala. Code § 12-15.71.1 (1975 & Supp. 1994); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 500 (West
1984 & Supp. 1995); 1987 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-803; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-140(e) (West
1979); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.058 (West 1988); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 705, § 405/1-8.1 (Smith-Hurd 1987
& Supp. 1994); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.22 (West 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.185.2(b) (West
1993); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-103(24) (1978); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 62.135 (Michie 1986); N.J.
Rev. Stat. § 2A4A-44 (1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15.3 (1978); N.Y. Penal Law § 70.05
(McKinney 1987); 10 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1160.1 (West 1991); R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-7 (1981);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-137 (1987); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-330.1 (Michie 1993); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 13.40.160 (West 1993).
50. See, for example, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.160 (requiring use of sentencing
guidelines for certain serious juvenile offenses).
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disposition of juveniles who satisfy the criteria.5' Generally, only
children above a certain minimum age are subject to the terms of a
serious and habitual juvenile offender statute, 2 but this limitation is
by no means universal.53
Despite differences in form, all serious and habitual juvenile
offender statutes are, to a degree, punitive. Their punitive nature can
be seen in two ways. First, some statutes expressly acknowledge
their punitive purposes.54 Second, all serious and habitual juvenile
offender statutes impose particular sentences, or give the court
authority to impose tougher sentences, based on the offense a juvenile
commits.5 Statutes which set forth a sentence or disposition based on
the crime committed (as opposed to focusing on individual
characteristics of the juvenile offender) are, according to current
theory, primarily designed to punish rather than to rehabilitate.6
51. See, for example, 1987 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §19-2-803. States have also addressed the
problem of serious juvenile crime by enacting legislative waiver statutes, which require the
juvenile court to decline jurisdiction and "waive" the offender to the adult system for certain
specified crimes. See, for example, N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1987) (giving the
criminal courts automatic jurisdiction over the adjudication of certain serious crimes by older
juveniles). Note, as in the case of New York, that a state may have more than one manner of
addressing serious juvenile crime. Because the focus of this Note is on the adjudication and
disposition of serious juvenile delinquents within the juvenile system itself, such legislative
waiver provisions will not be analyzed in detail. Analyses of waiver-transfer statutes appear in
Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 337-42 (cited in note 9) and
Feld, 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 701-08 (cited in note 15).
52. See, for example, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-126(a) (West Supp. 1994) (stating that a
child must have "attained the age of fourteen years at the time of the alleged delinquent act");
Iowa Code Ann. § 232.22.2.c(1) (West 1994) (stating that a child must be "at least fourteen years
of age").
53. See 10 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1160.2(11) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "serious juvenile
offender" and "habitual juvenile offender" as any person under age eighteen who has been
adjudicated delinquent for the commission of certain specified crimes).
54. See, for example, N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2A.4A-20 (West 1987) (Senate Judiciary
Committee Statement) (stating that "[t]his bill recognizes that the public welfare... can be
served most effectively through an approach which provides for harsher penalties for juveniles
who commit serious acts or who are repetitive offenders"); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 62.211(2)(b)
(Michie Supp. 1993) (stating that the juvenile court may impose on a "serious or chronic" juve-
nile offender "any otherpunitive measures the court determines to be in the best interests of the
public" (emphasis added)); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.010(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1988)
(stating that the purpose of the juvenile code includes providing for "punishment commensurate
with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender).
55. Whether they operate by setting forth penalties for certain offenses, or by ascribing
"serious or habitual offender" status according to the offenses a juvenile has committed, all such
statutes place at least some emphasis on the wrongful act itself. See, for example, 1990 Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 19-2-803(1) (defining "violent juvenile offender" as one who has committed one of a
number of specified "crime[s] of violence"); Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 53.045 (West Supp. 1992)
(subjecting to a new 40-year maximum sentence only those juveniles who commit one of six
listed felonies); Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13.40.020 (creating three categories of juvenile offend-
ers, with presumptive sentences for each, based in part on the offense ajuvenile commits).
56. See Feld, 68 B.U. L. Rev. at 833 (cited in note 7) (explaining that "[p]unishment im-
poses unpleasant consequences because of an offender's past offenses," whereas rehabilitative
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Serious and habitual juvenile offender statutes do, however,
vary in the means chosen to achieve their punitive goals. While there
are far too many variations to be covered fully in this Note, the typical
approaches fall into two major categories: (1) "get tough" reforms;
and (2) integrated serious and habitual juvenile offender programs.
A. "Get Tough" Statutes
The phrase "get tough" refers to those statutory reforms which
are primarily designed to impose harsher or more certain
punishments on juveniles. Generally, such statutes minimize or
eliminate specific attempts at rehabilitating or treating delinquent
youth. Typical get tough approaches include: (1) imposing mandatory
minimum sentences or sentencing ranges for listed offenses; 7 (2)
authorizing the juvenile court to impose a determinate sentence for
specified offenses, rather than the traditional indeterminate period
used for the majority of delinquent acts;58 (3) authorizing the juvenile
court to impose a longer period of incarceration, up to a statutory
maximum, for certain serious offenses;59 (4) authorizing the juvenile
court to impose harsher sentences, at the discretion of the juvenile
judge, on youths who commit certain listed crimes;60 (5) extending the
juvenile court's jurisdiction over serious juvenile offenders to a later
age than is allowed for non-serious juvenile delinquents;61 (6) giving
the juvenile court discretion to place the serious or habitual offender
treatment "focuses on the mental health, status, and future welfare of the individual rather
than on the commission of prohibited acts'.
57. Ala. Code § 12-15-71.1(a), (b) (Supp. 1994) (requiring mandatory one year sentences for
juveniles adjudicated delinquent for certain violent or serious offenses); N.Y. Penal Law § 70.05.3
(McKinney 1987) (requiring the court to impose a minimum prison sentence, depending on the
offense, for certain violent crimes); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.160(1) (West 1993) (requiring
court to sentence a serious juvenile offender within a specific "standard range," based on the
offense, with exception for "manifest injustice").
58. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-2-803(3) (West Supp. 1994) (authorizing the court to impose
minimum sentences for violent juvenile offenders and requiring that juveniles shall not be
released without prior written approval of the committing court).
59. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-141(a) (West Supp. 1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A4A-44(3)
(West 1987) (authorizing the extension of sentences for up to an additional two or five years,
depending on the offense); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.045 (West Supp. 1992) (imposing a sen-
tence of up to forty years on offenders ten to sixteen years of age who commit any of six listed
serious felonies).
60. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 62.211(2)(b) (Michie Supp. 1993) (permitting the juvenile court
to impose on a serious juvenile offender "any other punitive measures the court determines to
be in the beat interests of the public".
61. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.022(4)(a), (b) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that the juvenile court
retains jurisdiction over non-serious juveniles until they reach age 19, and over serious juvenile
offenders until age 21).
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in an adult facility;62 and (7) authorizing the court to place serious or
habitual juvenile offenders in juvenile boot camps. 3
1. A "Pretense of Benevolence":6 Critiquing the Rehabilitative Ideal
Current scholarship, which overwhelmingly focuses on the get
tough variety of reforms, views the enactment of these statutes as an
ominous trend for the juvenile justice system and its traditionally
rehabilitative philosophy. Several prominent scholars in the field,
chief among them Barry Feld, have emphasized the punitive nature of
serious and habitual juvenile offender laws. They view such statutes
both as evidence of the incompatibility of rehabilitation and punish-
ment, and as an indication that states are increasingly rejecting reha-
bilitation as a goal of the juvenile justice system.65 Some even
conclude that an independent juvenile court is no longer justified, on
the ground that the juvenile system has become no more than a
criminal court without the procedural protections of the adult
system.66
Professor Feld, for example, claims that recent reforms are
largely punitive in nature, in that they are designed to deliver
62. Iowa Code Ann. § 232.22.2.c (West 1994) (allowing a child to be placed in adult deten-
tion center if there is probable cause to believe the child committed a felony, or certain other
serious crimes).
63. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.057 (West Supp. 1993) (authorizing the creation of a boot camp
program to provide "an intensive educational and physical training and rehabilitative program
for appropriate children').
64. See note 71.
65. Forst and Blomquist, for example, explain that the juvenile system h~s become more
punitive both through reforms which increasingly authorize waiver (sometimes called transfer)
of juveniles to the adult system, Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy
at 337 (cited in note 9), and by legislative changes to the juvenile system itself, which have
authorized or required juvenile courts to emphasize punitive goals, id. at 342. See also Feld, 75
Minn. L. Rev. at 696 (cited in note 15) (arguing that the juvenile court has been "criminalized"
in four ways: removal of status offenders from its jurisdiction, increased use of waiver, more
punitive sentencing practices, and more formalized procedures).
66. See Feld, 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 723 (stating that "[als juvenile courts converge proce-
durally and substantively with criminal courts, is there any reason to maintain a separate court
.. ?"). Others who question the juvenile court's continued viability include Janet E. Ainsworth
and Katherine H. Federle, whose works are discussed below. See notes 69-70 and accompany-
ing text. In 1992, an A.B.A. meeting was dedicated specifically to discussing the possible elimi-
nation of the juvenile court's jurisdiction over delinquency proceedings. See Whose Court Is it,
Anyway?: The Future of the Juvenile Court, Session of the Criminal Justice Section, American
Bar Association, 1992 Annual Meeting (San Francisco, Aug. 10, 1992). It should be noted that
neither Forst and Blomquist, nor Charles Springer, advocate abolition of the juvenile court,
despite the fact they concur with Feld and others as to the problems of the juvenile system. See
Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 374-75; Charles E. Springer,
Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 397,419 (1991).
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sanctions based on the nature of the offense a juvenile commits. s7 For
Feld, punishment and rehabilitation are fundamentally irreconcilable
philosophies: Punishment views the offender as morally responsible
for his or her acts, and thus deserving of sanctions appropriate to his
or her past offenses, while rehabilitation assumes that external
circumstances cause the juvenile's undesirable acts, and therefore
focuses on "treating" the child to effect changes in his or her future
behavior.68 Similarly, Professor Katherine Federle asserts that recent
legislative reforms have been overwhelmingly punitive, and as such
have made the "new" juvenile court a "model of accountability,
retribution and deterrence."69 And Janet Ainsworth, who likewise
views legislative changes as focusing on punishment and
accountability almost exclusively, writes that such reforms "strike at
the very heart" of the juvenile court's original rehabilitative
philosophy.70
Thus, for Feld and like-minded theorists, the enactment of
punitive, offense-oriented serious and habitual juvenile offender stat-
utes inevitably signals a rejection of the rehabilitative philosophy
67. Feld, 68 B.U. L. Rev. at 821-22 (cited in note 7). Feld writes:
The United States Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault transformed the juvenile
court into a very different institution than that envisioned by its Progressive creators.
Judicial and legislative efforts to harmonize the juvenile court with Gault's constitu-
tional mandate have modified the purpose, process, and operation of the juvenile justice
system.... As the juvenile court system deviates from the Progressive ideal, it increas-
ingly resembles, both procedurally and substantively, the adult criminal court system....
Changes in juvenile courts' "purpose clauses" to emphasize characteristics of the offense
rather than the offender reflect the ascendance of the Principle of Offense.... [These
changes] indicate . . . the substantive and procedural criminalization of the juvenile
court.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
68, Id. at 833. Feld writes:
Conceptually, punishment and treatment are mutually exclusive penal goals. Both
make markedly different assumptions about the sources of criminal or delinquent be-
havior. Punishment assumes that responsible, free-will moral actors make blamewor-
thy choices and deserve to suffer the prescribed consequences for their acts.
Punishment imposes unpleasant consequences because of an offender's past offenses. By
contrast, most forms of rehabilitative treatment ... assume some degree of determi-
nism. Whether grounded in psychological or sociological processes, treatment assumes
that certain antecedent factors cause the individual's undesirable conditions or behavior.
Treatment and therapy, therefore, seek to alleviate undesirable conditions in order to
improve the offender's future welfare.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
69. Katherine H. Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the
Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. Contemp. L. 23, 38 (1990). For Federle, such
punitive reforms provide one justification for abolishing the juvenile court. Id. at 50.
70. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1083, 1105 (1991).
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upon which the juvenile court system was founded.71 More signifi-
cantly, because the juvenile court does not provide the procedural
protections offered by the adult criminal system,72 this increased
punitiveness calls into question the juvenile court's very existence.
According to Feld, the current juvenile court gives juveniles the
"worst of both worlds: . . . [they receive] neither the protections ac-
corded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children."73 In short, Feld's theory maintains that be-
cause the juvenile court has adopted the punitive, offense-based ap-
proach of the adult criminal court without providing the procedural
safeguards of the adult system, a separate juvenile court is no longer
justified.74
That rehabilitation and punishment are based on fundamen-
tally different philosophies cannot be disputed. Moreover, to the
extent that certain commentators highlight the juvenile court's
procedural shortcomings, their theories raise important questions
about whether juveniles do, or can, receive 'Justice" from the juvenile
system. Nonetheless, theories like Feld's, Ainsworth's, and Federle's
have been rightly criticized for overstating the conflict between the
71. See Feld, 68 B.U. L. Rev. at 859 (cited in note 7) (stating that "the reality... is that
rehabilitation no longer remains a substantial goal of the juvenile criminal justice system"
(quoting State v. Schaff, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 743 P.2d 240, 253 (1987) (Goodloe, J., dissenting)));
Ainsworth, 69 N.C. L. Rev. at 1105 (noting that as a result of recent shifts in the philosophy of
juvenile justice, "state juvenile court hearings have come to resemble adult criminal trials').
See also Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 342 (cited in note 9)
(explaining that during the 1970s, lawmakers "began to respond to calls for harsher measures
against juvenile crime by altering the espoused purposes and administration of the juvenile
court"); id. at 359 (concluding that the current juvenile justice system "is radically different from
the one conceived and constructed by its founders. Gone are the informality, the paternalism,
and the pretense of benevolence").
72. While Gault did mandate that juvenile courts provide certain formal procedural
protections, Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 57, juveniles still lack the constitutional right to a jury
trial, see McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545, and "[flew of the states that sentence juveniles punitively
provide jury trials," Feld, 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 719 (cited in note 15). Moreover, Gault's guaran-
tee of a right to counsel in delinquency prodeedings, 387 U.S. at 41, "remains unrealized,"
largely because so many juveniles waive this right, Feld, 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 720-21.
73. Feld, 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 718 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 596 (1966)).
74. Id. at 723. Similarly, Katherine Federle advocates abolishing the juvenile court, for a
variety of reasons: the rehabilitative system's failure to reduce juvenile offense rates, the
legislative reforms' criminalization of the juvenile court, the Supreme Court's failure to extend
the full array of constitutional protections to children in delinquency proceedings, the increasing
punishment of status offenders, and the inadequate enforcements of existing children's rights in
juvenile court. Federle, 16 J. Contemp. L. at 35-48 (cited in note 69). Janet Ainsworth also
argues in favor of eliminating the juvenile court's jurisdiction over delinquency cases, in part
because society's current view of childhood is no longer consistent with the "child-adult dichot-
omy" on which the juvenile court was founded. Ainsworth, 69 N.C. L. Rev. at 1118, 1106 (cited
in note 70). Ainsworth explains that "we now perceive children as much more like adults, as
demonstrated by our willingness to impose punitive sanctions via the juvenile courts." Id.
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goals of punishment and rehabilitation, and for advocating the rather
extreme position of eliminating the juvenile court.7 5
2. The Unique Nature of Offenders: In Search of a System That Can
Achieve Both Punitive and Rehabilitative Goals
Thus, several theorists have suggested that the juvenile court,
despite its growing emphasis on punishment and despite its proce-
dural "failings," remains a viable and important institution in which
rehabilitative goals still have a significant role to play. For example,
while Forst and Blomquist also view recent reforms as being largely
punitive,75 they nonetheless support the concept of a separate juvenile
justice system, on the grounds that these punitive reforms have not
effectively reduced juvenile delinquency, and that juveniles are, in
their view, inherently less mature and thus less culpable for their
acts. 7 Forst and Blomquist conclude that some of the reforms of re-
cent years were necessary, in that they provided the adjustments
needed to bring juvenile justice into line with the empirical realities of
rising crime rates and the relatively ineffective "rehabilitation-only"
philosophy of the early juvenile court.78 Yet, unlike the "abolitionists,"
Forst and Blomquist still approve of maintaining the juvenile justice
system because they feel that it is more appropriate and effective in
reducing juvenile delinquency.79
Similarly, Judge Gordon Martin asserts that, despite the puni-
tive reforms of the last two decades, rehabilitation maintains an im-
portant place in the juvenile court,80 and suggests that a meaningful
balance between rehabilitation and punishment is possible within the
juvenile system.81
75. See notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
76. Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 359 (cited in note 9).
77. Id. at 365-69.
78. Id. at 374.
79. Id. at 375. Forst and Blomquist base their conclusion on the results of current re-
search, which they claim has "reconfirmed the fundamental premise" of the original juvenile
court: 'Juveniles are different from adults" and, as such, should generally not be made to bear
the same responsibility or punishments as adults. Id. at 374-75. (The term "abolitionist," as
used here, is borrowed from Irene Rosenberg. See note 46.)
80. Hon. Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juveline Court: Is There Still a
Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 57, 59-60 (1992).
81. Martin suggests certain reforms-allowing longer detention periods for "dangerous
juveniles" and eliminating the shield of confidentiality for serious offenses-in an effort to
preserve a viable role for the juvenile court and its traditionally rehabilitative role. Id. at 64-65.
Several other theorists, too numerous to discuss in detail in this Note, have taken issue with the
view that punishment and rehabilitation cannot be reconciled and with the position that the ju-
venile court, because it is more punitive, is no longer justified. See, for example, Mahoney, 5
Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 461-65 (cited in note 8) (urging the implementation of
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Finally, Irene Rosenberg argues persuasively for preserving
the juvenile court's jurisdiction over delinquency cases, even while
acknowledging the truth of the "abolitionists"' criticisms: that
juvenile courts regularly punish under the guise of treating young
offenders, and that they fail to provide children the constitutional and
procedural protections afforded adults in criminal courts.82 Rosenberg
supports the juvenile court for two reasons. First, she claims that
abolitionists (such as Feld, Ainsworth, and Federle) overstate the
disparity between the juvenile and criminal courts' procedural
protections, give too little merit to the gradual procedural
improvements in the juvenile system, and "idealize[ ]" the degree to
which constitutional guarantees are enforced in adult criminal
trials.83 Second, Rosenberg asserts that adult courts will inadequately
consider children's youth and immaturity in assessing guilt and
determining sentences. 4  Rosenberg thus makes a persuasive
argument that juvenile courts, "despite all their failings" do a better
job of protecting children's rights, and at least of recognizing the goal
of rehabilitation, than would criminal courts. 5
In sum, theorists such as Martin, Forst, Blomquist, and
Rosenberg contend that there is a place for rehabilitative goals and
methods within the juvenile justice system. Despite recent punitive
reforms, they urge that the juvenile system maintains an important
role in addressing the problem of juvenile offenders.
B. Integrated Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Programs:
Balancing Punishment and Rehabilitation
The second type of statute implements integrated serious and
habitual juvenile offender programs. In contrast to "get tough" stat-
utes, these programs attempt to combine punishment and rehabilita-
tion in a single, comprehensive plan.8s To the extent they succeed,
a "comprehensive plan for children's services as an essential element of "solving" the juvenile
crime problem); Springer, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 419-20 (cited in note 66)
(stating'I want to remodel the system, not dismantle it").
82. Rosenberg, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. at 165-66 (cited in note 46).
83. Id. at 166-67, 173.
84. Id. at 174-75.
85. Id. at 184-85.
86. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 501(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995) (establishing an inter-
agency program, utilizing law enforcement, probation departments, schools, and juvenile courts,
to comprehensively address the problems of serious and habitual offenders); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
39.058(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993) (creating a program for serious and habitual juvenile offenders
that "combine[s] 9 to 12 months of secure residential treatment followed by a minimum of 9
months of aftercare"); Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 705, § 405/1-8.2 (Smith-Hurd 1987 & Supp. 1994)
(authorizing creation of a "Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program," which is
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integrated serious and habitual juvenile offender ("SHJO") statutes
demonstrate that rehabilitation and punishment are compatible, both
in theory and in practice. These comprehensive programs, often
overlooked by commentators like Feld, thereby support the claim that
punitive reforms can be reconciled with-and perhaps improve
upon-the juvenile court's traditionally rehabilitative focus.
Integrated programs for serious and habitual juvenile offend-
ers exist in approximately one-third to one-half of all U.S. jurisdic-
tions.87 The characteristics of these programs vary considerably from
state to state,8 8 and therefore any attempt to evaluate such programs
inevitably involves some degree of generalization. Thus, this Note
analyzes the common features of integrated SHJO programs, rather
than focusing on any one project. The phrase "integrated serious and
habitual juvenile offender (SHJO) program," as used in this Note,
refers to such a model approach, although the names89 (and details) of
such programs vary in practice.
The very design of most integrated SHJO programs demon-
strates a continued commitment to achieving both punishment and
rehabilitation. The common characteristics of SHJO programs in-
clude: an initial period of incarceration or detention; the use of small
facilities; an emphasis on accountability; intensive supervision
throughout the program; and a substantial offering of rehabilitation
services.
For example, most integrated SHJO programs involve an in-
itial period of incarceration in a secure facility90 or in the home,91
using house arrest or daily contacts with the probation officer.92 This
a "multi-disciplinary interagency" case management system); 10 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1160.3.5
(West Supp. 1995) (mandating the creation of a "Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender
Program" which shall include, among other things, "[a] case management system for ensuring..
. diversion of youth from the juvenile justice system, services for.. . and.., intensive supervi-
sion of serious... and habitual juvenile offenders'; Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-330.1(B) (Michie Supp.
1994) (creating a "Serious or Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program," which is
defined as "a multidisciplinary interagency case management and information sharing system).
87. Dean J. Champion, The Juvenile Justice System: Delinquency, Processing and the
Law 386 (Macmillan, 1992).
88. Id. at 394 (noting that some are '"front-end' alternatives to secure detention," others
combine incarceration with subsequent community supervision, and a third type uses "secure
detention).
89. Typical plan names include "Intensive Supervision Program," "Serious and Habitual
Juvenile Offender Comprehensive Action Program," and "Intermediate Punishment Program."
90. See, for example, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.058(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that their
program includes "9 to 12 months of intensive secure residential treatment). See also note 8.
91. See Champion, Juvenile Justice System at 391 (cited in note 87) (describing the Ohio
Department of Youth Services's four-phase program, which begins with intensive home-based
supervision).
92. See id. at 388.
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initial period of incarceration or in-home confinement is clearly de-
signed to fulfill punitive objectives: community protection through
deterrence and incarceration, 3 as well as, to a certain extent,
retribution.94 Overwhelmingly, such programs require or emphasize
detention in small, non-institutional settings. 5 Integrated SHJO
programs also emphasize accountability, both through the detention
period, and by requiring victim restitution.96
In addition, integrated SHJO programs generally require in-
tensive supervision for a relatively lengthy period of time after the
initial period of full confinement.9 7 Such periods of frequent and
highly-structured supervision are designed to satisfy two goals. One
is continued punishment (both social control and retribution).98 A
second is ensuring continued contact with the offender so that reha-
bilitative services may be delivered effectively.99
93. See, for example, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 503 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995) (listing
policies of the serious and habitual offender program as "resist[ing] the release of the ...
offender at all stages of the prosecution" and as "detain[ing] minors in custody" whenever neces-
sary); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 705, § 405/1-8.1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1987) (stating that one reason for
establishing Illinois's "Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program" for juveniles
is the need "to effectively intensify the supervision" of serious and habitual juvenile offenders);
10 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1160.1.A.3 (West 1991) (explaining that the "Serious and Habitual
Offender Act" is in part designed to "enhanc[e] community control of crime").
94. See, for example, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.002(6) (West Supp. 1993) (including 'punitive
efforts" in a list of elements of juvenile justice system for serious offenders); Cal. Weif. & Inst.
Code § 500 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995) (stating that the purpose of the "Serious and Habitual
Offenders" provision was, in part, to "prosecute... agressively" and "sentence... appropri-
ately" such offenders).
95. See, for example, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.002(6) (stating that "the juvenile justice system
should avoid the inappropriate use of... large institutions"). In Massachussetts, for example, a
highly successful program for delinquent youth utilizes a network of small residential facilities,
rather than large training schools. Jerome Miller and Lloyd E. Ohlin, The New Corrections:
The Case of Massachusetts, in Margaret Y. Rosenheim, ed., Pursuing Justice for the Child 154,
172 (U. of Chicago, 1976).
96. See, for example, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.058(2)(a)(11) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring,
where appropriate, victim restitution); Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at
459-60 (cited in note 8) (discussing advantages of comprehensive programs which include both
detention and fines and rehabilitative services).
97. See, for example, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.058(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that "a
minimum of 9 months of aftercare" is required after detention in a secure facility); Champion,
Juvenile Justice System at 391 (cited in note 87) (explaining that the Delaware County (Ohio)
SHJO program involves, after an initial period of incarceration, continuous monitoring of the
offender, 16 hours per day, seven days per week).
98. See Chanmpion, Juvenile Justice System at 389 (stating that a common element of
integrated SHJO programs is "aggressive supervision and control.., as a part of the 'get tough'
movement"); Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, Between Prison and Probation: Intermediate
Punishments in a Rational Sentencing System 177-79 (Oxford, 1990) (explaining that intensively
supervised probation, house arrest, and detention in a secure facility all have a punitive
"purpose and method," even though the degree to which each is punitive varies).
99. By definition, the delivery of various rehabilitative services to serious juvenile offend-
ers involves a significant amount of interagency cooperation and coordination, and many states
with integrated SHJO programs expressly provide for such cooperation in the statutes authoriz-
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Indeed, a hallmark of integrated SHJO programs is that they
provide a wide array of rehabilitation services, which frequently con-
tinue for substantial lengths of time after the initial period of incar-
ceration is complete. 1°° For many programs, a primary rationale for
such services, and the principal focus of their delivery, is to increase
the likelihood of the juvenile's successful reintegration into society.1°1
Integrated serious and habitual juvenile offender programs,
emphasizing initial detention, accountability, and treatment and
reintegration services, are plainly designed to achieve a workable
balance between the rehabilitative and punitive goals of the juvenile
justice system. Thus, they challenge critics' conclusions that the two
philosophies are theoretically incompatible.
ing the programs. See Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-330.1(B) (Supp. 1994) (describing the SHJO as a
"multidisciplinary interagency case management and information sharing system"); 10 Okla.
Stat. Ann. § 1160.4.1 (West Supp. 1995) (charging the Oklahoma Commission on Children and
Youth with the responsibility for, among other things, overseeing the interagency agreements
necessary for carrying out the Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Program); Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 705, § 405/1-8.1 (Smith-Hurd 1987 & Supp. 1994). An analysis of the role of interagency
compacts to treat and punish serious juvenile offenders is beyond the scope of this Note. It is
mentioned here only to highlight the fact that the integrated SHJO programs discussed here, to
the extent they emphasize intensive supervision and the delivery of a variety of services to the
delinquent child, presuppose and depend on the ability of a state to coordinate the efforts of its
various crime prevention, juvenile justice, social services, and educational agencies.
100. See, for example, 10 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1141.C.3 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring the
development, as part of the SHJO program, of a "case management system for ensuring appro-
priate ... services for... juvenile offenders" in the program); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.058(a) (West
1993) (listing services to be delivered by the SHJO program, including "diagnostic evaluation
services... substance abuse intervention, mental health services... gang-related behavior
interventions . . . job training, job placement . . . [and] educational services); Va. Code
Ann. § 16.1-330.1.B (Michie 1993) (stating that community "Serious or Habitual Offender
Comprehensive Action Programs" shall supervise such offenders to "enhance current conduct
control, supervision, and treatment efforts.. .'; Champion, Juvenile Justice System at 394
(cited in note 87) (noting that Ohio's juvenile intensive supervision programs include many
different treatment services, including- "individual counseling, family counseling, in-home
family services, community sponsors, alternative education, job training, and substance abuse
counseling").
101. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.058(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring "a minimum of nine
months of aftercare); Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 705, § 405/1-8.1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1987 & Supp. 1994)
(stating that a "serious habitual offender comprehensive action program" is needed to "increase
the opportunity for success with juvenile offenders); 10 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1141(D) (West Supp.
1995) (requiring Oklahoma Department of Human Services to develop the "services necessary to
implement the Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Program," with such services "including
but not limited to ... transitional programs"). See also Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy
Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17 Crim. Just. & Behav. 93, 103 (1990) (stating that a
primary emphasis of the Violent Juvenile Offender Program, an integrated plan adopted by
several urban juvenile courts across the country, is "reintegration of violent delinquents into the
community').
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C. Integrated SHJO Programs and "Get Tough" Statutes Compared:
The Questionable Effectiveness of Get Tough Approaches
Indeed, comparing the effectiveness of "get tough" reforms with
those of integrated SHJO programs calls into question the conclusions
of the juvenile system's critics, both as to the alleged incompatability
of punishment and rehabilitation, and as to the viability of the
juvenile court. Such a comparison demonstrates that "get tough"
reforms, while they may be moderately successful at achieving certain
punitive goals, generally are no more effective in this area than are
integrated SHJO programs. Moreover, where rehabilitation is
concerned, integrated SHJO programs are overwhelmingly more
successful.
1. The Punishment Objective
a. "Get Tough" Statutes
Given that punishment is frequently the primary objective
behind the "get tough" type of serious and habitual juvenile offender
statute, 10 2 one should expect that such statutes would be more effec-
tive at punishing than are traditional juvenile court laws. To a cer-
tain extent, this is true. Minimum and determinate sentences, for
example, are often more likely to achieve the goal of retribution than
are treatment-oriented dispositions, which are not necessarily propor-
tional to the juvenile's offense. 03 Those statutes that allow for more
punitive sentences, or for placement of serious juvenile offenders in
adult facilities, accomplish the retributive goal. Similarly, to the
extent that the get tough variety of serious and habitual juvenile
offender statutes emphasizes mandatory or extended sentences in
secure facilities, such statutes certainly incapacitate during the
period of the juvenile's sentence.10 4
102. See, for example, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.40.010(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1988)
(stating that purposes of juvenile code include making juveniles "accountable" for their acts and
imposing "punishment comensurate with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile
offender").
103. See Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 456 (cited in note 8) (noting
the success of Washington's punitive statute at achieving standardized sentencing).
104. See Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 354 (cited in note
9) (noting that as a result of Washington's determinate sentencing, 87% of serious or chronic
offenders were incarcerated in state facilities, as opposed to only 60% before the sentencing act
was passed). It should be noted that traditional juvenile statutes allow for indeterminate
sentencing, based on flexible standards such as the "welfare" or "best interests" of the child
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However, it is questionable whether get tough serious and
habitual juvenile offender statutes, to the degree they focus on
mandatory or extended sentences, successfully deter juvenile
delinquency.105 Punishment deters effectively only so long as the
offender and the broader audience (potential juvenile delinquents) at
whom it is directed are rational, responsible persons. 106  Yet
researchers have begun to question whether many serious juvenile
delinquents respond rationally to punishment.07 Moreover, many
studies suggest that determinate sentences for juveniles, if
unaccompanied by other services, such as counseling and education,
do little to reduce recidivism.108 In sum, while most of the get tough
serious and habitual juvenile offender statutes may meet the goals of
retribution and incapacitation, their deterrent effect is open to
question.
offender. See, for example, Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-802 (1989). As such, traditional
statutes leave judges, in some instances, freer to impose longer sentences than would be
possible under a serious juvenile offender statute with a specific sentencing range for a given of-
fense. See Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 336-37 (explaining
that children's rights advocates have supported determinate offense-based sentencing statutes,
on the ground that they will avoid the "disproportionate periods of incarceration" that are
possible under indeterminate, flexible "treatment" statutes).
105. Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 456 (cited in note 8) (noting that
Washington legislation has not reduced recidivism among juvenile offenders). Studies have
shown that mandatory minimum sentences do little to reduce crime rates in the adult popula-
tion. According to a report of the Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy in Washington, D.C.
mandatory minimums do not deter because most criminals are "poor, poorly educated, . . . and
are not likely to apply cost-benefit analysis before engaging in criminal behavior." Fighting
Crime; Don't Hop on the Get-Tough Hog Pile, Star Tribune (Minneapolis) 26A (Feb. 6, 1994).
106. Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 454. Other factors affecting
deterrence include whether the public perceives that punishment is "consistent... predictable
and immediate," id., and the degree of certainty with which punishment is inflicted. Lee E.
Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice Between Rules and Standards, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
351, 371. The severity of punishment does not affect deterrence. Id.
107. "Rationally' as used here, refers to weighing the costs and benefits of an action-here
a criminal act-prior to engaging in such conduct. Young offenders are not "rational" to the
extent they do not consider the consequences of their acts in this manner, and therefore the
threat of punishment does little to deter them.
As Justice Brennan explained in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), "[tlhe deterrent
value of... punishment rests 'on the assumption that we are rational beings who always think
before we act, and then base our actions on a careful calculation of the gains and losses
involved."' Id. at 404 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gardiner, The Purposes of Criminal
Punishment, 21 Mod. L. Rev. 117, 122 (1958)). However, noted Justice Brennan, the likelihood
that a youthful offender makes this kind of cost-benefit analysis before engaging in a
sanctionable act is "so remote as to be virtually nonexistent,"' especially where more severe
punishments are concerned. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)).
Justice Brennan's comments dealt specifically with the deterrent effect of capital punishment on
young offenders, but the basic theory underlying his conclusions is applicable to all types of
juvenile sanctions.
108. See Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 456 (cited in note 8).
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b. Integrated SHJO Statutes
Available research suggests that integrated serious and habit-
ual offender programs rehabilitate and punish juvenile delinquents at
least as effectively as do get tough reforms. While these programs
may have non-threatening names, such as "alternative" sentencing,
"intermediate" punishment, or "intensive" supervision, and while they
often place great emphasis on the delivery of rehabilitative services,
they also punish. Because such programs normally include a period
of detention in a secure facility, 10 9 and generally emphasize intensive
supervision and control throughout,110 they ultimately serve the
punitive goals normally associated with imprisonment in a traditional
facility: retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence.
First, integrated SHJO programs can satisfy retributive goals.
Integrated SHJO programs are retributive because they drastically
reduce the juvenile's liberty for a significant period of time, in
proportion to the juvenile's offense."' To the extent society normally
associates detention or incarceration with retribution, and feels that
criminals or juvenile delinquents receive their 'Just deserts" when
they are incarcerated, these integrated SHJO programs undeniably
satisfy the goal of retribution.112
109. See notes 90-93.
110. See, for example, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.058(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993) (listing required
components of the program); 10 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1141(D) (West Supp. 1995) (same); Richard
G. Wiebush, Juvenile Intensive Supervision: The Impact on Felony Offenders Diverted From
Institutional Placement, 39 Crime & Delinq. 68, 72 (1993) (describing Ohio's model "intensive
supervision program").
111. Moreover, despite the punishment-treatment dichotomy put forth by Feld (Feld
focuses on the incompatability of punishment, in which dispositions are based on the offense
committed, and rehabilitation, in which dispositions are based on the needs of the individual
juvenile, see notes 66-68 and accompanying text), there is nothing inherent in SHJO programs
that would prohibit making the length of incarceration hinge on the offense the juvenile com-
mitted. The aftercare portion of the program can, based on each individual's needs, adequately
serve the program's rehabilitative goals once incarceration is completed. The Ohio program
studied by Wiebush, for instance, involved four phases, each of which lasted for mandatory
minimum periods of time, and each of which involved gradually lower levels of supervision.
Wiebush, 39 Crime & Delinq. at 71-72.
112. See Richard J. Lundeman, Prevention and Control of Juvenile Delinquency 191
(Oxford, 2d ed. 1993) (emphasizing that intensive supervision programs are, at least to a degree,
punitive, that they often "start tough," and even in later stages of the program are "quick to
resort to detention" when juveniles are uncooperative); Morris and Tonry, Between Prison and
Probation at 178-79 (cited in note 98) (highlighting that intermediate punishments, such as in-
tensive supervision programs, often involve severe reductions in autonomy). One could, of
course, make the argument that such programs, especially to the extent that they may not
impose periods of detention as long as may be given in an adult court, are not sufficiently re-
tributive for those juveniles who have committed truly heinous crimes, such as murder. Indeed,
there is a limit to the retributive nature of integrated SHJO programs, and it may be that for
the most outrageous juvenile offenses, about which there is a high degree of social consensus as
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Second, because of their emphasis on initial detention and
continuing intensive supervision, integrated serious and habitual
juvenile offender programs also incapacitate quite effectively. Typical
programs, in addition to detaining juveniles in secure facilities, in-
volve a wide array of control and surveillance methods. Oklahoma's
Serious and Habitual Offender Program enabling statute, for exam-
ple, requires the development of the following control strategies:
tracking services, weekend detention, out-of-home placements (for
five-day periods), thirty-day intensive placements, and "highly struc-
tured" placements.113 Similarly, other programs utilize house arrest,
drug tests, daily surveillance checks by a case manager, curfew, elec-
tronic surveillance, hourly school reports, mandatory employment,
and regular employment checks.11 Given their strong emphasis on
controlling the daily movements and activities of their juvenile par-
ticipants, integrated SHJO programs serve the goal of incapacitation
at least as effectively as do get tough, determinative sentencing
methods."5
Third and finally, to the extent a program's deterrent effect
can be measured by its recidivism rates, integrated SHJO programs
are at least, if not more, effective than determinate or mandatory
sentences. For example, Jeffrey Fagan's study of integrated SHJO
programs in four urban areas found significantly lower recidivism
rates for violent, serious, and total crimes among juveniles who had
completed the programs, as compared to juveniles with similar
records and crimes who had received traditional punishment."16
to the need for severe punishment and community protection, the transfer process would better
serve retributive goals than would an integrated SHJO program. See Martin, 25 Conn. L. Rev.
at 62-63 (cited in note 80) (discussing transfer as a "safety valve" which removes the most
violent and severe cases ofjuvenile crime from the juvenile system).
113. 10 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 1141(D) (West Supp. 1995).
114. Wiebush, 39 Crime & Delinq. at 72 (cited in note 110); Champion, Juvenile Justice
System at 387, 393 (cited in note 87).
115. See Wiebush, 39 Crime & Delinq. at 87 n.8 (explaining that in a comparative study of
two groups of serious juvenile offenders-one placed in an intensive supervision program and
the other given traditional incarceration and parole-the juveniles in the intensive supervision
program did not recidivate, on average, "until almost seven months after they entered the
program... about the same as the average length [of time after an] institutional stay").
116. Fagan, 17 Crim. Just. & Behav. at 104-05 (cited in note 101). See also Martin, 25
Conn. L. Rev. at 90 (cited in note 80) (citing "promising indications" of reductions in recidivism
among juveniles placed in integrated, intensive supervision programs). Similarly, it was re-
cently reported that a six-year Missouri study of that state's highly integrated programs for
violent and chronic offenders (such programs utilize "small, high-security units" and "an exten-
sive network of community programs') found that only 15% of youth who were committed to the
programs and discharged later ended up in adult prisons. L.V. Hackley, What Can We Do to
Reduce Juvenile Crime? Training Schools Aren't the Answer; Searching for Solutions, News &
Record (Greensboro, N.C.) F-3 (Feb. 6, 1994).
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Studies of recidivism rates thus strongly suggest that integrated
serious and habitual juvenile offender programs, to the extent they
are effectively implemented, deter as well as, and perhaps better
than, traditional dispositional methods."7
2. The Rehabilitation Objective
a. "Get Tough" Statutes
Get tough serious and habitual juvenile offender statutes do
very little to achieve the goal of rehabilitation. Most such statutes, as
noted above, emphasize mandatory terms of incarceration, longer
sentences, or simply harsher terms of punishment. There is little
evidence to suggest that longer or harsher sentences do much to reha-
bilitate offenders or reduce recidivism,1 8 despite the popular belief,
often echoed in the purpose clauses of such statutes, that tougher
sentencing policies will cause juveniles to turn away from crime."9
Most research suggests that longer and harsher sentences actually
inhibit rehabilitation.20 Thus, to the extent that these serious
juvenile offender reforms merely adopt a get tough philosophy of
longer and more severe terms of incarceration, it is highly doubtful
that they can achieve society's punitive goals without sacrificing the
traditional rehabilitative aims of the juvenile court.
b. Integrated SHJO Statutes
Integrated serious and habitual juvenile offender programs
also rehabilitate far more effectively than do "get tough" sentencing
practices. Indeed, to the extent that many get tough statutes attempt
117. See Wiebush, 39 Crime & Delinq. at 84-85 (cited in note 110) (finding that an inten-
sive supervision program in Ohio did little to reduce recidivism rates, but suggesting that this
finding may be because the youth he studied had gone through the program in its beginning
stages, before it had 'mature[d] operationally'). Notably, Fagan's study also showed evidence of
a strong relationship between the "therapeutic integrity" of a program-the "strength and
consistency of implementation,... and.., the program design"--and the program's success at
reducing recidivism. Fagan, 17 Crim. Just. & Behav. at 106.
118. Fagan, 17 Crim. Just. & Behav. at 101 (citing several studies which showed that
"institutionalization does not result in lower recidivism rates than nonincarcerative sanctions
with close supervision.. ., but may actually worsen it").
119. See, for example, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 500 (West 1984) (stating the legislature's
intention "to identify offenders early in their careers" and 'prosecute them aggressively').
120. See Anna S. Richo, Note, Mandatory Sentencing for Habitual Juvenile Offenders:
People v. J.A., 34 DePaul L. Rev. 1089, 1104 n.132 (1985) (citing various sources which have
found that traditional incarceration does not rehabilitate, and that many facilities become
"schools of crime').
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to combat serious juvenile crime by requiring longer or determinate
terms of incarceration, the use of adult facilities, and the like, they
make no claim to be rehabilitative, at least none beyond the general
argument that "teaching a child a lesson" helps to rehabilitate a
young offender.121 Integrated serious and habitual juvenile offender
programs, in sharp contrast, are designed to deliver a wide variety of
rehabilitative services,122 and as such are far more likely to rehabili-
tate juvenile offenders. That such programs often have lower recidi-
vism rates than do get tough punishment methods, as noted above,
may, in part, be evidence of their rehabilitative success.
Nonetheless, a common criticism of such programs is that they
only rehabilitate if they are effectively implemented. Critics argue
that the multitude of services sounds good on paper, or in legislative
purpose clauses, but that such services are often not delivered in
reality. 123 Clearly, program implementation can vary in practice,2 4 so
it is not unreasonable to conclude that some integrated SHJO pro-
grams, despite their lofty goals, fail to rehabilitate effectively.
However, at least one commentator who has studied this question
found that an Ohio integrated SHJO program delivered a much
higher level of supervision and services than that which existed in
traditional probation or parole. 25 The existence of several fairly
successful alternate programs, such as Project New Pride in Denver,
and programs in Massachusetts and Utah, lends support to this
conclusion.126
* * *
121. Springer, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 416 (cited in note 66) (explaining
that teaching ajuvenile that crime has negative consequences serves to rehabilitate).
122. See text accompanying notes 99-100.
123. For example, Ciro Scalera, executive director of the Association of Children for New
Jersey, testified before the United States House Subcommittee on Human Resources as to the
damage done by inadequate funding of preventive and alternative programs. New Jersey's
juvenile code, explained Scalera, was modified in 1984 to authorize judges to use intermediate
sentencing (i.e., between probation and prison). However, alternative programs were never
funded under the revised law, so the promise of such options remains "umfuifilled." Hearing on
Juvenile Crime and Delinquency: Do We Need Prevention?, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Human Resources of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 64
(March 22, 1994).
124. See Fagan, 17 Crim. Just. & Behav. at 104, 106 (cited in note 101) (comparing pro-
gram implementation in four cities); Champion, Juvenile Justice System at 397-98 (cited in note
87) (citing various reasons for failure of intensive supervision programs).
125. Wiebush, 39 Crime & Delinq. at 84 (cited in note 110) (noting that the referral of
youths to rehabilitative services was "extraordinarily high).
126. See Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 459-60 (cited in note 8)
(discussing the success of these programs); Champion, Juvenile Justice System at 394 (cited in
note 87) (discussing various successful intensive supervision programs in Ohio); Krisberg and
Austin, Reinventing Juvenile Justice at 180-81 (cited in note 11) (discussing intensive supervi-
sion, rehabilitation, and aftercare provided by the Key Program in Massachussetts).
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In sum, integrated serious and habitual juvenile offender pro-
grams, given their focus on providing counseling, job training, job
placement, drug abuse rehabilitation, education, and other services,
rehabilitate offenders far more effectively than do get tough ap-
proaches to serious juvenile crime. The generally lower recidivism
rates among offenders who have participated in such programs pro-
vides support for this conclusion. At least to the extent they are effec-
tively implemented, integrated SHJO programs therefore appear to
offer a promising means of achieving both punitive and rehabilitative
goals for the juvenile system's most difficult cases: serious and
habitual offenders.
IV. INTEGRATED SHJO PROGRAMS AND THE
FUTURE OF THE JUVENILE COURT
There is substantial evidence that integrated serious and ha-
bitual juvenile offender programs effectively balance the goals of
rehabilitation and punishment-not only in theory but also in prac-
tice. This evidence calls into question both the claim that recent
legislative reforms signal a wholesale rejection of the juvenile court's
rehabilitative philosophy and the argument that the modern juvenile
system has lost its primary justification for existence.127 In addition
to the research discussed above, there are several other reasons why a
punitive stance toward serious juvenile crime can be reconciled with
the rehabilitative, child-centered philosophy of the juvenile system as
a whole. The arguments of critics who claim that such a balance is
not possible simply do not withstand scrutiny.
First, punishment and rehabilitation are theoretically compat-
ible. In recent years, researchers have begun to suggest that some
degree of punishment, especially for serious offenders, is appropriate
and compatible with the juvenile system's child-centered philoso-
phy.128 Even critics such as Professor Feld have acknowledged this
127. See Feld, 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 693 (cited in note 15) (arguing there is no reason to
maintain a separate juvenile court system). Others who advocate abolishing the juvenile court
include Janet E. Ainsworth and Katherine H. Federle. See note 74.
128. See Springer, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 416 (cited in note 66)
(arguing that "[tihe single most important rehabilitative factor of juvenile court disposition is
the lesson given, namely, that you cannot get away with it").
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possibility.'29 Plainly, the two are not mutually exclusive goals: some
types of "punishment" can serve to rehabilitate a young offender.
Second, integrated programs for serious and habitual juvenile
offenders, even if they do contain elements of retribution,
incapacitation, and deterrence, are not as purely punitive as are get
tough approaches. Florida's program, for example, mandates that
juveniles sent to the serious offender program receive an array of
services--counseling, education, job training, etc.-during their term
of confinement. 13 Thus, despite the fact that integrated SHJO
programs are punitive in some respects, they place significant
emphasis on rehabilitation, and to this extent are fully compatible
with the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system. They therefore
refute arguments that recent reforms have pulled the juvenile system
exclusively in the punitive direction.
Third, rather than signaling the demise of the rehabilitative
model, some acknowledgment of the system's punitive goals, where
such goals are appropriate, may actually serve to uphold the validity
of the juvenile court as a whole. Open acknowledgment that the ju-
venile justice system will hold serious and habitual juvenile offenders
accountable for their actions arguably increases the legitimacy of the
juvenile court by convincing the public that the court is aware of its
responsibility to punish when punishment is needed. 13' Indeed, by
acknowledging the need to include punishment among the system's
goals for the small minority of youth who qualify as serious and ha-
bitual juvenile offenders, integrated SHJO programs may serve as a
"safety valve" that preserves the rehabilitative nature of the court as
a whole. By officially marking off a certain group of violent,
dangerous, and habitual offenders for more punitive sentencing, such
statutes alleviate the pressure to make the entire court more
129. See Feld, 68 B.U. L. Rev. at 845 (cited in note 7) (noting that "[c]ourts, as well as
legislatures, increasingly acknowledge that 'punishment' may be an acceptable purpose of a
juvenile court's 'therapeutic' dispositions."
130. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.058(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993). Programs in Massachusetts,
Maryland, and New Jersey also offer, or require, a variety of activities, such as job training,
schooling, counseling, and community service. Krisberg and Austin, Reinventing Juvenile
Justice at 179-81 (cited in note 11).
131. Martin, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 84 (cited in note 80) (arguing that the juvenile court will
be more accepted if the public is assured that the court will adequately protect society from
dangerous youth); Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Dealing With Serious, Repeat Juvenile Offenders 66 (1982) (noting that the ultimate aim of the




punitive, and allow the non-violent cases (the majority) to be settled
under a rehabilitative model.132
At the same time, there is little support for the argument that
integrated SHJO programs, because they are rehabilitative, cannot
effectively punish or protect society.133 First, by creating a compre-
hensive means of dealing with serious juvenile crime within the juve-
nile justice system, such programs actually help to ensure that seri-
ous offenders receive some type of punishment. Ironically, when
serious juvenile offenders are transferred to adult criminal court,
where they are comparatively non-serious criminals, they frequently
go unpunished.134 The claim that integrated serious and habitual
juvenile offender programs will fail to hold society's "worst" juvenile
offenders accountable for their delinquent acts is therefore unfounded.
Second, arguments that integrated SHJO programs cannot
effectively punish or protect society ignore the evidence that such
programs, are, as explained above, equally or more likely to reduce
recidivism than are the traditional methods of incarceration and
probation. 3, Given that youths, even more so than adult criminals,
cannot be kept locked up forever, and thus that all but the most vi-
cious juvenile criminals will reenter society at some future date, it
simply makes common sense to maintain a system with the potential
to rehabilitate and reintegrate juveniles into society effectively.136
While integrated SHJO programs may not be a panacea, they cer-
tainly offer both juveniles and society more hope than the institu-
tional incarceration of the adult system. 37
Most significantly, there is little merit to claims that a sepa-
rate juvenile system is no longer justified merely because it has
132. Compare Martin, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 83 (cited in note 80) (suggesting that transfer
can operate as a "safety valve" which preserves the juvenile court's structure by removing from
its jurisdiction the most severe cases).
133. Forst and Blomquist explain that society has supported "get tough" reforms based on
the perceived failure of rehabilitative programs to control juvenile crime. Forst and Blomquist,
5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 332 (cited in note 9).
134. Springer, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 417 (cited in note 66) (stating
that "[what happens to... transferees is that, although sometimes juveniles are sent to a prison
... , more frequently they receive probation and no appreciable sanction at all because of judges'
understandable unwillingness to send these youngsters to adult prison).
135. See notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
136. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that "we cannot write these children off forever ... at some point they will be freed
from incarceration).
137. See Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 448 (cited in note 8)
(arguing that "incarceration rarely reforms offenders ... and often makes them worse"). See
also Ira M. Schwartz, (In)justice for Juveniles: Rethinking the Best Interests of the Child 51
(Lexington Books, 1989) (noting that incarceration does little to reduce juvenile crime, and
citing recidivism rates as high as 60-85% from some facilities).
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adopted some of the punitive goals and methods of the adult system.13 8
Such claims give too little weight to the fact that children are, on
some level, fundamentally different than adults. Indeed, even if there
is some social consensus that youths are more culpable for their ac-
tions than was once thought, our society has traditionally
viewed-and continues to view-children as significantly less devel-
oped, less responsible, and more in need of protection than adults. 139
Many of our laws reflect this belief: children below a certain age are
denied the right to vote, the permission to drive or drink alcohol, and
they are allowed the defense of diminished capacity-all because of
society's belief that children need protection, and should be treated
differently than adults in certain key respects.1 40 This understanding
suggests that eliminating the juvenile court, even if it now serves a
hybrid of punitive and rehabilitative goals, would be fundamentally
misguided as well as unfair both to juveniles and society as a whole.'4'
Finally, the relatively small size of the serious and habitual
juvenile offender population renders inaccurate the view that the
existence of serious and habitual juvenile offender programs signals a
wholesale shift of the juvenile court from its rehabilitative origins. 42
Serious and habitual juvenile offender statutes affect only a small
percentage of the young delinquents brought before the juvenile
court.4 3 Most juveniles will not meet the definition of a "serious" or
138. See, for example, Feld, 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 693 (cited in note 15) (arguing that there is
no reason to maintain a separate juvenile court system on the ground that recent reforms have
made the system more punitive).
139. See Springer, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 420 (cited in note 66)
(acknowledging that young people are qualitatively different than adults in their "imperfect
judgment, immature attitudes, impulsivity, [and] difficult-to-resist need to please their peers"
which justifies "our treatingyoung law violators differently from older ones"). See also note 9.
140. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 824 (1988) (plurality opinion). See also
Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 326-27, 371-72 (cited in note 9)
(discussing modem society's different treatment of adolescents and adults).
141. As one district court judge in Roxbury, Massachusetts, put it: "[I]f a violent juvenile is
amenable to treatment, society deserves the chance to gain the non-violent citizen that juvenile
might become." Martin, 25 Conn. L. Rev. at 91 (cited in note 80). Indeed, while "rehablitation"
can mask a punitive reality, it does not necessarily follow that all, or even most, rehabilitative
programs are simply pretexts for punishment. Nor is it advisable to condemn all rehabilitation
programs simply because some, or many, such programs have not been adequately imple-
mented. See Rosenberg, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. at 184-85 (cited in note 46) (arguing that the adult
criminal system would be worse than even the flawed juvenile court).
142. See Feld, 75 Minn. L. Rev. at 696 (cited in note 15) (stating that "[tihe juvenile court
has been transformed" into a criminal court).
143. Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The
Juvenile Court's Response to Violent Juvenile Offenders: 1985-89 2 (1993) (stating that violent
juvenile offenders make up only 7% of all delinquency cases reported); Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame
J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 457 (cited in note 8) (noting that "[slerious juvenile offenders are a
tiny minority in most American juvenile courts'.
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"habitual" juvenile offender, and thus will be adjudicated according to
the rehabilitative standards the vast majority of states still follow for
non-serious juvenile offenses.," The existence of relatively punitive
programs for serious and habitual juvenile offenders does not, there-
fore, provide support for the conclusion that the juvenile system as a
whole has rejected its rehabilitative philosophy or methods.
V. CONCLUSION
Punishment and rehabilitation can be reconciled. In the con-
text of the problem of serious and habitual juvenile offenders, a satis-
factory balance can be achieved through integrated, multi-agency
programs which combine an initial period of secure detention with
ongoing intensive supervision and the delivery of a variety of services
designed to rehabilitate and reintegrate problem youth. The fact that
several such programs have satisfied both punitive and rehabilitative
goals relatively successfully strongly suggests that a workable balance
is possible. Moreover, while several states have taken a "get tough"
approach to juvenile crime, the fact that a significant number of juris-
dictions has chosen the integrated approach suggests that society is
not yet prepared to reject fully the rehabilitative philosophy of the
juvenile court. This continued commitment to rehabilitating delin-
quent youths, and the relative success of integrated SHJO programs,
also suggests that commentators' calls for the elimination of the juve-
nile court are as yet unjustified.
At least one author has suggested that the integrated ap-
proach, in that it combines punitive and rehabilitative goals and
methods, more closely approximates the true ideals of the original
juvenile court system than does either a purely rehabilitative or the
punitive model. An integrated program, asserts Charles Springer,
would achieve the true meaning of parens patriae, that is, the state's
responsibility to serve as parent for youthful delinquents.145
According to Springer, the parens patriae philosophy should be
interpreted to require juvenile courts both to punish young offenders
144. Mahoney argues that "[ulndue emphasis on the serious offenders may undermine the
juvenile court's basic function in the community and inhibit the development of a full range of
non-institutional sanctions." Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 457.
145. The 1899 Illinois Act instructed the juvenile courts to provide juvenile offenders with
treatment which "approximated 'as nearly as may be that which should be given by their par-
ents.'" Springer, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 420 (cited in note 66). 'The spirit of




and then care for them in a manner that is likely to result in more
acceptable behavior in the future.146
The balance Professor Springer suggests is possible.
Integrated programs that both hold serious and habitual juvenile
offenders accountable and provide effective rehabilitative services are
one possible means of balancing the seemingly irreconcilable goals of
punishment and rehabilitation.
Nonetheless, one must be careful to define what is meant by
"success" in this context. To the extent such programs do not succeed
(and there is good reason to doubt that they can "cure" the problem of
serious and habitual juvenile crime), the problem may rest not with
the goals and methods of the juvenile court, but with larger social
problems. No program can successfully rehabilitate juveniles, or
reintegrate them into society, if the society to which they return is
devoid of legitimate opportunities for success. 147 One cannot deny that
there are valid bases for the criticisms of the rehabilitative model of
the juvenile court, or for the public's desire for tougher juvenile sen-
tencing. Certainly there is some need for reform within the system.
However, the juvenile justice system has become an all-too-
easy target for those who seek to reduce youth delinquency. It is too
tempting for the public and lawmakers alike to believe that if we
merely make our laws against serious and habitual juvenile offenders
"tougher," we will solve the problem. The real source of the problem,
however, may lie in society's unwillingness, or inability, to commit
resources to our children on a broader scale: to ensure that there are
viable opportunities for education, jobs, and, even more fundamen-
tally, basic necessities such as adequate nutrition and personal
safety.148 Integrated serious and habitual juvenile offender programs
are a step in the right direction, in that they acknowledge that an
intensive and continued commitment of resources is needed if we are
to have any realistic hope of successfully reintegrating young offend-
ers into society. But they are only one piece of the solution, and if
society does not place greater emphasis on providing for children in
general, it is unlikely such programs, however well-designed or inten-
tioned, will lead to any lasting or significant reduction in the problem
of serious juvenile crime.
146. Id.
147. Mahoney, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 454-55 (cited in note 8).
148. Id. at 465. See also Springer, 5 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy at 410 (cited in
note 66) (stating that "[b]ecause of a lot of demagogic clamor and public disinformation, the




We cannot, as Karl Llewellyn once wrote, "'legislate' a change
of heart.'' 49 Yet, there is a strong argument that a change of heart
toward our youth is just what is needed if we are to make real ad-
vances against juvenile delinquency. The important lesson, in the
present situation, is to recognize that until such a change occurs, any
juvenile justice legislation--even the promising serious and habitual
juvenile offender programs discussed in this Note--can have, at best,
a limited effect.
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